Robert J Aumann

Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

(No reviews yet) Write a Review

ISBN 13:: 9780262526265
author:: Robert J Aumann
format:: Paperback
publisher:: MIT Press
language:: English
Publication Year:: 1995
Pages:: 360
Dimensions:: 16 x 2.8 x 23.1 cm
Genre:: Business, Finance & Law, Economics,
Condition:: New
Availability:: Item usually sent within 5 working days

£41.97

Current Stock: 5

Quantity:

Description

Description

This seminal work by Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler explores the dynamics of arms control negotiations in repeated games, laying the foundation for research in this field.

The authors' original five papers, collected here for the first time, examine how players must learn from each other's actions when they have incomplete information about the game being played. The book delves into the competitive zero-sum side of the theory of repeated games, as well as cooperative phenomena where one player may want to signal information to another.

Originally conducted under contract to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, this research has since become a general framework for understanding information concealment, revelation, signaling, and learning in any repeated competitive situation.

View AllClose