T. M. Scanlon
Being Realistic about Reasons
- ISBN 13:
- 9780198748106
- author:
- T. M. Scanlon
- format:
- Paperback
- publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- language:
- English
- Publication Year:
- 2016
- Pages:
- 144
- Dimensions:
- 14.2 x 0.8 x 21.5 cm
- Genre:
- Society, Politics & Philosophy, Philosophy,
- Condition:
- New
- Availability:
- Item usually sent within 10 working days
Description
Thomas Scanlon offers a nuanced defence of normative cognitivism, the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action.
He addresses three common objections to this position, including concerns about metaphysical implications, knowledge claims, and the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action. Scanlon responds by exploring a general account of ontological commitment, which he argues provides an adequate framework for understanding how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths.
The defence of normative cognitivism is qualified, as it is unclear whether all statements about reasons for action have determinate truth values. Nevertheless, Scanlon offers a range of new insights into the nature of reasons, including an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, and a defence of the method of reflective equilibrium.